update wiggleverse-www/0011/SESSION-0011.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-06-11T08-10--INPROGRESS.md

wiggleverse-www/0011/SESSION-0011.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-06-11T08-10--INPROGRESS.md

@@ -17,8 +17,33 @@ Find the right scoped token in a secret and use it instead of the OHM bot's
 
 ```
 
+## Plan
+
+> Anchor: direct operator instruction (least-privilege follow-up to session 0010's
+> deferred token-choice decision) — treated as a leaf `task`.
+
+Replace the org-owner-grade token in `wgl-www-finances-git-token` with one minted
+on a dedicated `finances-bot` Gitea user whose only access is wiggleverse-www.
+
+## State (checkpoint, 2026-06-11 ~08:20 PST)
+
+- AUDIT DONE: no narrowly-scoped write token exists in ANY org project's secrets.
+  `ohm-rfc-app-gitea-bot-token` and `planner-planner-gitea-token` are different
+  bytes but BOTH org-owner-grade (admin/push on wiggleverse-org/corp,
+  session-history, ohm-content, engineering, www). Read tokens can't push;
+  `wgl-gitea-issue-token` is issue-scoped. `planner-planner-token` is not a valid
+  Gitea token. Probes leaked no bytes (scope read via the /user error message).
+- PLAN AGREED with operator: (1) operator creates `finances-bot` user (admin UI)
+  and mints a write:repository token on it; (2) agent grants the bot write on
+  wiggleverse/wiggleverse-www only (Keychain admin API token); (3) operator adds
+  the token as version 2 of `wgl-www-finances-git-token` via stdin (command
+  handed over); (4) agent re-probes breadth (should see exactly one repo),
+  runs the in-cloud DRY_RUN execution, then DESTROYS version 1 (broad token —
+  its bytes remain safe in its original ohm secret).
+- WAITING on the operator's gestures (1) and (3). Job reads `:latest`, so the
+  swap needs no job update.
+
 ## Deferred decisions
 
-_Autonomous-mode low-confidence calls the driver made and would have
-liked operator input on. Appended as the session runs; surfaced at
-finalize. Empty if none._
+_None yet this session._
+