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Session 0011.0 — Transcript
App: wiggleverse-www Start: 2026-06-11T08-10 (PST) Type: planning-and-executing Claude-Session: 75ed8255-3a55-4049-b438-f3e571918074 Status: PLACEHOLDER — claimed at session start; finalized at session end.
This file reserves session ID 0011 for wiggleverse-www. The driver replaces this body with the full transcript and renames the file to its final SESSION-0011.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-06-11T08-10--.md form at session end.
Launch prompt
Find the right scoped token in a secret and use it instead of the OHM bot's
Plan
Anchor: direct operator instruction (least-privilege follow-up to session 0010's deferred token-choice decision) — treated as a leaf
task.
Replace the org-owner-grade token in wgl-www-finances-git-token with one minted
on a dedicated finances-bot Gitea user whose only access is wiggleverse-www.
State (checkpoint, 2026-06-11 ~08:20 PST)
- AUDIT DONE: no narrowly-scoped write token exists in ANY org project's secrets.
ohm-rfc-app-gitea-bot-tokenandplanner-planner-gitea-tokenare different bytes but BOTH org-owner-grade (admin/push on wiggleverse-org/corp, session-history, ohm-content, engineering, www). Read tokens can't push;wgl-gitea-issue-tokenis issue-scoped.planner-planner-tokenis not a valid Gitea token. Probes leaked no bytes (scope read via the /user error message). - PLAN AGREED with operator: (1) operator creates
finances-botuser (admin UI) and mints a write:repository token on it; (2) agent grants the bot write on wiggleverse/wiggleverse-www only (Keychain admin API token); (3) operator adds the token as version 2 ofwgl-www-finances-git-tokenvia stdin (command handed over); (4) agent re-probes breadth (should see exactly one repo), runs the in-cloud DRY_RUN execution, then DESTROYS version 1 (broad token — its bytes remain safe in its original ohm secret). - WAITING on the operator's gestures (1) and (3). Job reads
:latest, so the swap needs no job update.
Deferred decisions
None yet this session.