From 24ac9ae6e581c3c27193f175ffaaf76a6cc369a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Stull Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 08:14:05 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] update wiggleverse-www/0011/SESSION-0011.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-06-11T08-10--INPROGRESS.md --- ...TRANSCRIPT-2026-06-11T08-10--INPROGRESS.md | 31 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/wiggleverse-www/0011/SESSION-0011.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-06-11T08-10--INPROGRESS.md b/wiggleverse-www/0011/SESSION-0011.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-06-11T08-10--INPROGRESS.md index 1a63667..3292321 100644 --- a/wiggleverse-www/0011/SESSION-0011.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-06-11T08-10--INPROGRESS.md +++ b/wiggleverse-www/0011/SESSION-0011.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-06-11T08-10--INPROGRESS.md @@ -17,8 +17,33 @@ Find the right scoped token in a secret and use it instead of the OHM bot's ``` +## Plan + +> Anchor: direct operator instruction (least-privilege follow-up to session 0010's +> deferred token-choice decision) — treated as a leaf `task`. + +Replace the org-owner-grade token in `wgl-www-finances-git-token` with one minted +on a dedicated `finances-bot` Gitea user whose only access is wiggleverse-www. + +## State (checkpoint, 2026-06-11 ~08:20 PST) + +- AUDIT DONE: no narrowly-scoped write token exists in ANY org project's secrets. + `ohm-rfc-app-gitea-bot-token` and `planner-planner-gitea-token` are different + bytes but BOTH org-owner-grade (admin/push on wiggleverse-org/corp, + session-history, ohm-content, engineering, www). Read tokens can't push; + `wgl-gitea-issue-token` is issue-scoped. `planner-planner-token` is not a valid + Gitea token. Probes leaked no bytes (scope read via the /user error message). +- PLAN AGREED with operator: (1) operator creates `finances-bot` user (admin UI) + and mints a write:repository token on it; (2) agent grants the bot write on + wiggleverse/wiggleverse-www only (Keychain admin API token); (3) operator adds + the token as version 2 of `wgl-www-finances-git-token` via stdin (command + handed over); (4) agent re-probes breadth (should see exactly one repo), + runs the in-cloud DRY_RUN execution, then DESTROYS version 1 (broad token — + its bytes remain safe in its original ohm secret). +- WAITING on the operator's gestures (1) and (3). Job reads `:latest`, so the + swap needs no job update. + ## Deferred decisions -_Autonomous-mode low-confidence calls the driver made and would have -liked operator input on. Appended as the session runs; surfaced at -finalize. Empty if none._ +_None yet this session._ +