Ben Stull
9e6756f678
Backfills transcripts that existed only locally in ohm-infra: - 0019.1/.2/.3 - UX-polish wave subagent transcripts (driver 0019.0 never finalized) - 0026.1-.9 - security-audit-0026 subagent transcripts (driver abandoned/closed-out by 0068; audit drove published 0030 remediation) - 0073.0 - PPE/progressive-delivery + engineering-handbook session, originally drafted as a duplicate 0046.0; reassigned next free number (0072 taken by a concurrent session) sessions.json: add 0019/0073 titles, update 0026 title. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
111 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
111 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
# SESSION-0026.7 — Secret-byte sweep of the OHM session-history corpus
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Parent: SESSION-0026.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T13-46--INPROGRESS.md
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Subsession of OHM security-audit driver session 0026.
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Role: READ-ONLY assurance pass. Mission: sweep every published session
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transcript (plus the local working transcripts that get published) for
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any leaked SECRET BYTE — the §3-invariant-1 conversation-layer corollary.
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## Pre-state
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Two scan surfaces:
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1. PUBLISHED corpus — cloned read-only to `/tmp/ohm-hist-scan-0026`
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from `ssh://git@git.wiggleverse.org:2222/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history.git`
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(clone exit 0; reachable).
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2. LOCAL working transcripts at `/Users/benstull/git/ohm-infra/SESSION-*.md`.
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File counts:
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- Published: 29 transcript `.md` files (sessions 0001–0027, including
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the `.1/.2/.3` subsession files), plus `README.md`. = 30 `.md` total.
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- Local: 40 `SESSION-*.md` (includes INPROGRESS placeholders,
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SESSION-PROTOCOL.md, SESSION-L). Superset of published.
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ABSOLUTE RULE held throughout: never reproduce a suspected secret value;
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report only pattern-name + location + masked form. No secret bytes were
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written here or in the report.
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## Turn-by-turn arc
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1. Cloned the published repo (exit 0) and listed both surfaces. Counted
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files.
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2. **High-confidence shape sweep** (`grep -rniE`, both surfaces,
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`.git` excluded):
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- Provider prefixes: `sk-ant-`, `sk-…` (OpenAI), `AIza…` (Google),
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`ghp_/gho_/ghs_`, `glpat-` → **0 hits**.
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- PEM `BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY` → **0 hits**.
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- GCP SA JSON (`"private_key"`, `"private_key_id"`,
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`"type":"service_account"`) → **0 hits**.
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- JWT `eyJ….eyJ…` → **0 hits**.
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3. **Named-secret-var = value sweep** (SECRET_KEY, GITEA_BOT_TOKEN,
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OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET, etc. followed by `=`/`:`
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and a 6+ char value), plus a generic `*_TOKEN/_SECRET/_PASSWORD/_KEY
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= value` sweep. Hits were all adjudicated:
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- SESSION-0002 lines 950/961/967/971/974/1111 — placeholders:
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`FILL_FROM_PASSWORD_MANAGER`, `FILL_FROM_OPENSSL_OUTPUT_ABOVE`, and
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a literal `openssl rand -hex 32` gesture, and a doc example
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`GITEA_BOT_TOKEN=abc123...`. Not real values. CLEAN.
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- SESSION-0008 line 316 — a shell `grep '^OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET='`
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command line, no value. CLEAN.
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- SESSION-0008 lines 684/685 — the CRLF-bug writeup showing
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`OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=" gto_oge…\r"` and `SECRET_KEY="2e05383a849…\r"`.
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Opened lines 665–709. Both values are **deliberately truncated with
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an ellipsis** (`…`): only a ~3-char prefix of the gitea token and
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~11 hex chars of the 64-char SECRET_KEY are shown, as illustration
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of the trailing-`\r` taint. The remaining bytes are NOT present.
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Verified `gto_oge` appears at lines 70/291/684/689 and is the same
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truncated 3-char suffix every time — never full length. CLEAN
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(truncated, sub-threshold).
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- SESSION-0001 line 984 — `GITEA_SIGNING_KEY="7C9E…1592E2"` (40-hex).
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Opened lines 972–993: it's inside `/tmp/gitea-install.sh`, used with
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`gnupg`/`dirmngr` to verify the downloaded Gitea release signature.
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This is the **public GPG key fingerprint** Gitea publishes. Public
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by definition. CLEAN.
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4. **High-entropy string sweep** (standalone 48+ char base64/hex blobs in
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published corpus). Two non-trivial strings, both adjudicated:
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- 64-hex `15783e…574d` (SESSION-0006 line 503) — explicitly labeled
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`overlay snapshot sha256:…`. A content hash of the (non-secret)
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overlay config. CLEAN.
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- `AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5…` (SESSION-0001 line 683) — the standard
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`ssh-ed25519` **public-key** wire-format prefix. Public key, not a
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private key. CLEAN. (Consistent with the PEM sweep finding zero
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`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY` blocks.)
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5. **Final confirmation sweeps:**
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- bcrypt `$2[aby]$NN$` → **0 hits**.
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- `password/passwd/pass/pwd = value` (excluding prose, placeholders,
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`--password` flags, "password manager") → **0 hits**.
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- README.md → only prose about the no-secret-bytes policy. CLEAN.
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- `PRIVATE KEY / BEGIN OPENSSH / BEGIN RSA / BEGIN EC` → all matches
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are **prose discussing** private keys (e.g. "client unlocking that
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private key", "No private key material … nothing sensitive", and a
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grep-pattern example inside a transcript). No actual key blocks.
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CLEAN.
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## Cut state — VERDICT: CLEAN
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Zero secret bytes leaked across the entire corpus.
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- 29 published transcript `.md` files scanned (+README).
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- 40 local `SESSION-*.md` files scanned (published superset).
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- The only "value-shaped" hits were all expected/safe: placeholders,
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a public GPG fingerprint, a public ssh-ed25519 key, a sha256 overlay
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snapshot hash, doc examples, and two deliberately-ellipsis-truncated
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illustration values in the CRLF-bug writeup (sub-threshold, remainder
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never present). No secret REFERENCES were mistaken for bytes; no
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references were flagged as leaks.
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## Driver needs to know
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- Corpus is CLEAN. No remediation needed. The §3-invariant-1
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conversation-layer corollary is holding in practice across all
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published sessions to date.
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- One thing worth a glance (NOT a leak): SESSION-0008's CRLF-bug
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narrative quotes truncated `…`-elided forms of OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET and
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SECRET_KEY. They are safely below any useful threshold, but if the
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team wants zero value-fragments at all, those two could be masked to
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pattern-name only. Optional, low priority.
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- Published repo was reachable and freshly cloned; no "could not reach"
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caveat applies.
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