Backfills transcripts that existed only locally in ohm-infra: - 0019.1/.2/.3 - UX-polish wave subagent transcripts (driver 0019.0 never finalized) - 0026.1-.9 - security-audit-0026 subagent transcripts (driver abandoned/closed-out by 0068; audit drove published 0030 remediation) - 0073.0 - PPE/progressive-delivery + engineering-handbook session, originally drafted as a duplicate 0046.0; reassigned next free number (0072 taken by a concurrent session) sessions.json: add 0019/0073 titles, update 0026 title. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
5.4 KiB
SESSION-0026.7 — Secret-byte sweep of the OHM session-history corpus
Parent: SESSION-0026.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T13-46--INPROGRESS.md Subsession of OHM security-audit driver session 0026. Role: READ-ONLY assurance pass. Mission: sweep every published session transcript (plus the local working transcripts that get published) for any leaked SECRET BYTE — the §3-invariant-1 conversation-layer corollary.
Pre-state
Two scan surfaces:
- PUBLISHED corpus — cloned read-only to
/tmp/ohm-hist-scan-0026fromssh://git@git.wiggleverse.org:2222/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history.git(clone exit 0; reachable). - LOCAL working transcripts at
/Users/benstull/git/ohm-infra/SESSION-*.md.
File counts:
- Published: 29 transcript
.mdfiles (sessions 0001–0027, including the.1/.2/.3subsession files), plusREADME.md. = 30.mdtotal. - Local: 40
SESSION-*.md(includes INPROGRESS placeholders, SESSION-PROTOCOL.md, SESSION-L). Superset of published.
ABSOLUTE RULE held throughout: never reproduce a suspected secret value; report only pattern-name + location + masked form. No secret bytes were written here or in the report.
Turn-by-turn arc
-
Cloned the published repo (exit 0) and listed both surfaces. Counted files.
-
High-confidence shape sweep (
grep -rniE, both surfaces,.gitexcluded):- Provider prefixes:
sk-ant-,sk-…(OpenAI),AIza…(Google),ghp_/gho_/ghs_,glpat-→ 0 hits. - PEM
BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY→ 0 hits. - GCP SA JSON (
"private_key","private_key_id","type":"service_account") → 0 hits. - JWT
eyJ….eyJ…→ 0 hits.
- Provider prefixes:
-
Named-secret-var = value sweep (SECRET_KEY, GITEA_BOT_TOKEN, OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET, etc. followed by
=/:and a 6+ char value), plus a generic*_TOKEN/_SECRET/_PASSWORD/_KEY = valuesweep. Hits were all adjudicated:- SESSION-0002 lines 950/961/967/971/974/1111 — placeholders:
FILL_FROM_PASSWORD_MANAGER,FILL_FROM_OPENSSL_OUTPUT_ABOVE, and a literalopenssl rand -hex 32gesture, and a doc exampleGITEA_BOT_TOKEN=abc123.... Not real values. CLEAN. - SESSION-0008 line 316 — a shell
grep '^OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET='command line, no value. CLEAN. - SESSION-0008 lines 684/685 — the CRLF-bug writeup showing
OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=" gto_oge…\r"andSECRET_KEY="2e05383a849…\r". Opened lines 665–709. Both values are deliberately truncated with an ellipsis (…): only a ~3-char prefix of the gitea token and ~11 hex chars of the 64-char SECRET_KEY are shown, as illustration of the trailing-\rtaint. The remaining bytes are NOT present. Verifiedgto_ogeappears at lines 70/291/684/689 and is the same truncated 3-char suffix every time — never full length. CLEAN (truncated, sub-threshold). - SESSION-0001 line 984 —
GITEA_SIGNING_KEY="7C9E…1592E2"(40-hex). Opened lines 972–993: it's inside/tmp/gitea-install.sh, used withgnupg/dirmngrto verify the downloaded Gitea release signature. This is the public GPG key fingerprint Gitea publishes. Public by definition. CLEAN.
- SESSION-0002 lines 950/961/967/971/974/1111 — placeholders:
-
High-entropy string sweep (standalone 48+ char base64/hex blobs in published corpus). Two non-trivial strings, both adjudicated:
- 64-hex
15783e…574d(SESSION-0006 line 503) — explicitly labeledoverlay snapshot sha256:…. A content hash of the (non-secret) overlay config. CLEAN. AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5…(SESSION-0001 line 683) — the standardssh-ed25519public-key wire-format prefix. Public key, not a private key. CLEAN. (Consistent with the PEM sweep finding zeroBEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEYblocks.)
- 64-hex
-
Final confirmation sweeps:
- bcrypt
$2[aby]$NN$→ 0 hits. password/passwd/pass/pwd = value(excluding prose, placeholders,--passwordflags, "password manager") → 0 hits.- README.md → only prose about the no-secret-bytes policy. CLEAN.
PRIVATE KEY / BEGIN OPENSSH / BEGIN RSA / BEGIN EC→ all matches are prose discussing private keys (e.g. "client unlocking that private key", "No private key material … nothing sensitive", and a grep-pattern example inside a transcript). No actual key blocks. CLEAN.
- bcrypt
Cut state — VERDICT: CLEAN
Zero secret bytes leaked across the entire corpus.
- 29 published transcript
.mdfiles scanned (+README). - 40 local
SESSION-*.mdfiles scanned (published superset). - The only "value-shaped" hits were all expected/safe: placeholders, a public GPG fingerprint, a public ssh-ed25519 key, a sha256 overlay snapshot hash, doc examples, and two deliberately-ellipsis-truncated illustration values in the CRLF-bug writeup (sub-threshold, remainder never present). No secret REFERENCES were mistaken for bytes; no references were flagged as leaks.
Driver needs to know
- Corpus is CLEAN. No remediation needed. The §3-invariant-1 conversation-layer corollary is holding in practice across all published sessions to date.
- One thing worth a glance (NOT a leak): SESSION-0008's CRLF-bug
narrative quotes truncated
…-elided forms of OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET and SECRET_KEY. They are safely below any useful threshold, but if the team wants zero value-fragments at all, those two could be masked to pattern-name only. Optional, low priority. - Published repo was reachable and freshly cloned; no "could not reach" caveat applies.