session-history/ohm/0026/SESSION-0026.7-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T13-46--2026-05-28T13-54.md

# SESSION-0026.7 — Secret-byte sweep of the OHM session-history corpus

Parent: SESSION-0026.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T13-46--INPROGRESS.md
Subsession of OHM security-audit driver session 0026.
Role: READ-ONLY assurance pass. Mission: sweep every published session
transcript (plus the local working transcripts that get published) for
any leaked SECRET BYTE — the §3-invariant-1 conversation-layer corollary.

## Pre-state

Two scan surfaces:
1. PUBLISHED corpus — cloned read-only to `/tmp/ohm-hist-scan-0026`
   from `ssh://git@git.wiggleverse.org:2222/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history.git`
   (clone exit 0; reachable).
2. LOCAL working transcripts at `/Users/benstull/git/ohm-infra/SESSION-*.md`.

File counts:
- Published: 29 transcript `.md` files (sessions 0001–0027, including
  the `.1/.2/.3` subsession files), plus `README.md`. = 30 `.md` total.
- Local: 40 `SESSION-*.md` (includes INPROGRESS placeholders,
  SESSION-PROTOCOL.md, SESSION-L). Superset of published.

ABSOLUTE RULE held throughout: never reproduce a suspected secret value;
report only pattern-name + location + masked form. No secret bytes were
written here or in the report.

## Turn-by-turn arc

1. Cloned the published repo (exit 0) and listed both surfaces. Counted
   files.

2. **High-confidence shape sweep** (`grep -rniE`, both surfaces,
   `.git` excluded):
   - Provider prefixes: `sk-ant-`, `sk-…` (OpenAI), `AIza…` (Google),
     `ghp_/gho_/ghs_`, `glpat-` → **0 hits**.
   - PEM `BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY` → **0 hits**.
   - GCP SA JSON (`"private_key"`, `"private_key_id"`,
     `"type":"service_account"`) → **0 hits**.
   - JWT `eyJ….eyJ…` → **0 hits**.

3. **Named-secret-var = value sweep** (SECRET_KEY, GITEA_BOT_TOKEN,
   OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET, etc. followed by `=`/`:`
   and a 6+ char value), plus a generic `*_TOKEN/_SECRET/_PASSWORD/_KEY
   = value` sweep. Hits were all adjudicated:
   - SESSION-0002 lines 950/961/967/971/974/1111 — placeholders:
     `FILL_FROM_PASSWORD_MANAGER`, `FILL_FROM_OPENSSL_OUTPUT_ABOVE`, and
     a literal `openssl rand -hex 32` gesture, and a doc example
     `GITEA_BOT_TOKEN=abc123...`. Not real values. CLEAN.
   - SESSION-0008 line 316 — a shell `grep '^OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET='`
     command line, no value. CLEAN.
   - SESSION-0008 lines 684/685 — the CRLF-bug writeup showing
     `OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=" gto_oge…\r"` and `SECRET_KEY="2e05383a849…\r"`.
     Opened lines 665–709. Both values are **deliberately truncated with
     an ellipsis** (`…`): only a ~3-char prefix of the gitea token and
     ~11 hex chars of the 64-char SECRET_KEY are shown, as illustration
     of the trailing-`\r` taint. The remaining bytes are NOT present.
     Verified `gto_oge` appears at lines 70/291/684/689 and is the same
     truncated 3-char suffix every time — never full length. CLEAN
     (truncated, sub-threshold).
   - SESSION-0001 line 984 — `GITEA_SIGNING_KEY="7C9E…1592E2"` (40-hex).
     Opened lines 972–993: it's inside `/tmp/gitea-install.sh`, used with
     `gnupg`/`dirmngr` to verify the downloaded Gitea release signature.
     This is the **public GPG key fingerprint** Gitea publishes. Public
     by definition. CLEAN.

4. **High-entropy string sweep** (standalone 48+ char base64/hex blobs in
   published corpus). Two non-trivial strings, both adjudicated:
   - 64-hex `15783e…574d` (SESSION-0006 line 503) — explicitly labeled
     `overlay snapshot  sha256:…`. A content hash of the (non-secret)
     overlay config. CLEAN.
   - `AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5…` (SESSION-0001 line 683) — the standard
     `ssh-ed25519` **public-key** wire-format prefix. Public key, not a
     private key. CLEAN. (Consistent with the PEM sweep finding zero
     `BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY` blocks.)

5. **Final confirmation sweeps:**
   - bcrypt `$2[aby]$NN$` → **0 hits**.
   - `password/passwd/pass/pwd = value` (excluding prose, placeholders,
     `--password` flags, "password manager") → **0 hits**.
   - README.md → only prose about the no-secret-bytes policy. CLEAN.
   - `PRIVATE KEY / BEGIN OPENSSH / BEGIN RSA / BEGIN EC` → all matches
     are **prose discussing** private keys (e.g. "client unlocking that
     private key", "No private key material … nothing sensitive", and a
     grep-pattern example inside a transcript). No actual key blocks.
     CLEAN.

## Cut state — VERDICT: CLEAN

Zero secret bytes leaked across the entire corpus.
- 29 published transcript `.md` files scanned (+README).
- 40 local `SESSION-*.md` files scanned (published superset).
- The only "value-shaped" hits were all expected/safe: placeholders,
  a public GPG fingerprint, a public ssh-ed25519 key, a sha256 overlay
  snapshot hash, doc examples, and two deliberately-ellipsis-truncated
  illustration values in the CRLF-bug writeup (sub-threshold, remainder
  never present). No secret REFERENCES were mistaken for bytes; no
  references were flagged as leaks.

## Driver needs to know

- Corpus is CLEAN. No remediation needed. The §3-invariant-1
  conversation-layer corollary is holding in practice across all
  published sessions to date.
- One thing worth a glance (NOT a leak): SESSION-0008's CRLF-bug
  narrative quotes truncated `…`-elided forms of OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET and
  SECRET_KEY. They are safely below any useful threshold, but if the
  team wants zero value-fragments at all, those two could be masked to
  pattern-name only. Optional, low priority.
- Published repo was reachable and freshly cloned; no "could not reach"
  caveat applies.