session-history/ohm/0026/SESSION-0026.2-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T13-46--2026-05-28T13-51.md

# SESSION-0026.2 — rfc-app Injection & Input-Handling Security Audit

Parent: SESSION-0026.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T13-46--INPROGRESS.md
Subsession: 0026.2 (read-only audit leg of security-audit driver session 0026)
Date: 2026-05-28 (PST)
Target: rfc-app at /Users/benstull/git/rfc-app, tag v0.24.0 (HEAD 28015ed)
Scope: SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, path traversal, email/markdown sanitization.
Mode: READ-ONLY. No edits, no deploys, no git mutations. No secret bytes recorded.

## Pre-state

Driver assigned the injection & input-handling surface. Repo confirmed at
tag v0.24.0. Backend is FastAPI + SQLite (backend/app/*.py); frontend is
React 19 + Vite (frontend/src). Markdown via `marked` v18; no sanitizer
library in frontend/package.json dependencies.

## Turn-by-turn arc

1. Enumerated backend modules and grepped all 321 `execute*` call sites for
   f-string / `.format` / `%` / concat SQL. Pulled the ~16 dynamic-SQL hits.

2. SQL injection — examined every dynamic-SQL site:
   - api_notifications.py:274 (`UPDATE users SET {', '.join(sets)}`) — `sets`
     contains only hardcoded column-name literals; values parameterized via
     `args`. Safe.
   - api_notifications.py:479/483 (`UPDATE users SET {column} = ...`) —
     `column` from static `_CATEGORY_COLUMN` allowlist. Safe.
   - api_admin.py:413, notify.py:535, digest.py:201, email.py:610,
     notify.py:942/964/1000 — all IN-clauses built via `",".join("?" * len)`,
     the correct parameterized-IN idiom; values in the tuple. Safe.
   - notify.py:638/643 — `{now}` is the literal `datetime('now')`, not input.
   - api_admin.py:629/711/754 — `WHERE` built from `clauses` lists holding
     only fixed `col = ?` strings; user values parameterized; `limit` is
     FastAPI `int` with ge/le bounds. Safe.
   - db.py — connection/migration layer; migrations read trusted on-disk .sql.
   - Swept for dynamic ORDER BY / LIMIT / table-name injection: none found.
   Verdict: parameterization is consistent and correct across the backend.

3. XSS — found the markdown pipeline:
   - frontend/package.json has NO DOMPurify / rehype-sanitize / any sanitizer.
   - MarkdownPreview.jsx:101-102 — `previewMarked.parse(content)` →
     `hostRef.current.innerHTML = html`. The custom `Marked` instance only
     overrides the ```mermaid code-fence renderer; everything else is marked
     default (raw HTML passthrough). `escapeHtml` is applied ONLY to the
     mermaid placeholder text and error text, NOT the document body.
   - ProposalView.jsx:164 & 172 — `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` with the GLOBAL
     unconfigured `marked.parse(data.entry?.body)` / `proposed_use_case`.
   - Content sources: RFCView passes RFC body (previewContent/editorContent)
     into MarkdownPreview; DocsSessionTranscript / DocsSpec / DocsUserGuide /
     Philosophy / DocsSessionsAbout/Index also feed body through it. RFC body
     and proposal body/use-case are free-text authored by any invited user.
   - Backend: no sanitization on write (api.py — only Field max_length caps).
   - Self-refutation step: ran `marked.parse` on
     `<img src=x onerror=...> <script> [xss](javascript:...)`. Output passes
     all three through verbatim. With innerHTML/dangerouslySetInnerHTML the
     `<img onerror>`, `<svg onload>`, event handlers and `javascript:` links
     execute (the bare `<script>` won't via innerHTML, but the rest do).
     Confirmed stored XSS. Killed nothing — sink reachable, input
     attacker-controlled, no upstream sanitizer.
   - Editor.jsx:125 feeds marked output into TipTap `setContent`. NOT a raw
     sink — ProseMirror's schema normalizes/drops unknown nodes & attrs.
     Marked this path as solid, not a finding.

4. SSRF — checked every outbound-fetch module:
   - gitea.py: httpx client `base_url` fixed from config; owner/repo/path are
     gitea API path segments, not arbitrary hosts.
   - docs_sessions.py / docs_specs.py: fetch from raw/contents bases that come
     from env (operator) or framework defaults; the per-spec `url` is taken
     only from the operator-configured OHM_DOCS_SPECS manifest, never from
     user input — user can only select a pre-registered slug.
   - providers.py: provider base_url/model from env only.
   - turnstile.py: siteverify URL from env or fixed constant.
   - email.py: SMTP host from env.
   No user-controlled fetch URL anywhere. No SSRF.

5. Path traversal — docs_sessions / docs_specs:
   - api.py:242-280 validates `nnnn` against `^\d{4}$` and `filename` against
     a fully-anchored `_TRANSCRIPT_FILENAME_RE` (only SESSION-...md shape, no
     `/`/`..`) BEFORE any network call. docs_specs uses anchored
     `^[a-z0-9-]+$` slug guard, re-checked inside fetch_spec as defense in
     depth. FastAPI `{filename}` path param won't match `/` by default; even a
     decoded `%2f` fails the anchored regex. No traversal.

6. Email / markdown sanitization on backend:
   - email_invite.py / email_otc.py / email.py / digest.py all call
     build_envelope with body_plain only. Grep confirms NO caller passes
     `body_html=` anywhere — the multipart/alternative HTML branch in
     email_envelope.py:134-140 is dead in practice. All mail is plain text;
     user content (custom_message, display names) is plain-text interpolated.
     No email HTML-injection vector at v0.24.0.

## Cut state — findings

- F1 [High] Stored XSS via unsanitized markdown→HTML. marked + raw HTML sink
  (innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML), no sanitizer in pipeline or deps.
  Sinks: MarkdownPreview.jsx:101-102; ProposalView.jsx:164,172. Sources:
  RFC body, proposal body/use-case (any invited user), session transcripts.
  Confidence: HIGH (empirically confirmed marked passthrough; sink reachable;
  no upstream sanitization; backend stores raw). Invite-gating narrows the
  attacker pool but stored XSS by an invited user against admins/others
  (incl. admin session/cookie theft) remains. Fix: add DOMPurify and sanitize
  marked output before every innerHTML/dangerouslySetInnerHTML write (single
  shared helper), or render via a sanitizing markdown component; disable raw
  HTML and screen javascript:/data: URIs.

- F2 [Info] Dead HTML-email branch. email_envelope.py supports a text/html
  alternative but no caller supplies body_html. Not exploitable today; if
  HTML email is ever added, user content must be HTML-escaped first. Track so
  it's not turned on without escaping.

## What's solid

- SQL: consistent, correct parameterization across all ~16 dynamic-SQL sites;
  IN-clauses use the `"?" * len` idiom; dynamic column/where fragments are
  hardcoded allowlists; no ORDER BY/LIMIT/table-name injection; limits are
  bounded ints.
- SSRF: zero user-controlled outbound-fetch URLs; all bases env/config-fixed.
- Path traversal: anchored-regex validation at the route layer before any
  network call on both docs surfaces; defense-in-depth re-check in docs_specs.
- Editor.jsx markdown flows through TipTap/ProseMirror schema (not a raw sink).
- Email is plain-text only today.

## What the driver needs to know

- One real, shippable finding: F1 stored XSS. It is the highest-impact item
  on this surface. Recommend a single sanitize helper (DOMPurify) wrapping
  every marked render; covers MarkdownPreview, ProposalView, and all docs
  views at once.
- Everything else on this surface is clean. SQL/SSRF/path-traversal are well
  built and consistent — worth calling out as defensive strengths in the
  combined audit report.

## §19.2 candidates (flotilla-core extraction)

- None from this audit — findings are rfc-app application-layer, not flotilla
  CLI / deployment-shape concerns.