docs: position as commit-then-make + stock-then-sell ("not just"); URL → makers.wiggleverse.org

PR-FAQ revisions (operator-authored): headline "Wiggleverse launches Wiggleverse
Makers"; the platform supports traditional stock-then-sell in addition to
commit-then-make ("many makers" run commit-then-make); the maker keeps their own
storefront/checkout/customers; storefront software optional / bring-your-own;
Curated-By also in email marketing; Seattle dateline; public URL
makers.wiggleverse.org; wording polish.

Strategy memo (§2): propagate the positioning — "many" makers run commit-then-make,
and the platform also handles ordinary stock-then-sell (it is a full storefront)
with commit-then-make as the differentiator ("not just stock-then-sell"); beachhead
community label aligned to "miniatures". PR-FAQ header-note URL also → makers.wiggleverse.org.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/maker-platform-strategy.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Cheap production lowers cost **symmetrically** — for every entrant at once —
 
 Build for **independent makers** — positioned as "the curated maker marketplace before resellers polluted it," but executed so the durable value is flow, not stock.
 
-**The core primitive: commitment commerce.** The entire "gnarly 20%" that generic tools serve badly is one mechanism wearing many costumes. Pre-order, raffle, drop, monthly club, made-to-order commission, deposit-and-waitlist — every one is *collect committed demand before production, then make against it.* That's the inverse of Shopify's *stock-then-sell* (make it, shelve it, someone buys it), which is exactly why Shopify and generic tools serve makers badly: makers run on *commit-then-make*. The category you're building is **commitment commerce**, not storefront commerce — the drop/pre-order/club/commission cadence is the engine, and the storefront is just its surface.
+**The core primitive: commitment commerce.** The entire "gnarly 20%" that generic tools serve badly is one mechanism wearing many costumes. Pre-order, raffle, drop, monthly club, made-to-order commission, deposit-and-waitlist — every one is *collect committed demand before production, then make against it.* That's the inverse of Shopify's *stock-then-sell* (make it, shelve it, someone buys it), which is exactly why Shopify and generic tools serve makers badly: **many** makers run on *commit-then-make*. The category you're building is **commitment commerce**, not storefront commerce — the drop/pre-order/club/commission cadence is the engine, and the storefront is just its surface. (The platform still handles ordinary *stock-then-sell* too — it is a full storefront — so a maker can run their whole catalog on it; the positioning is *commit-then-make, not **just** stock-then-sell* — both modes, with commit-then-make the differentiator and the gnarly part nobody else serves, never the platform's only mode.)
 
 Two halves, treated differently:
 
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ The reframe: commitment commerce is not a feature of the storefront — it *is*
 
 Two maker-commerce-specific accelerants sit on top of the org thesis: **AI shopping agents are standing up** and need structured, trustworthy, real-time supply they cannot scrape — the narrow window to be the verified maker-supply rails agents route through opens now (§3, §7); and the same **non-extraction ethic** the org is built on (give value, don't extract — an OHM principle) is precisely what the out-of-the-money-flow, never-GMV-fee, usage-rights-ownership stance (§7) *is*, in maker-commerce form. Miss the window and the provenance grievance normalizes, the agent rails get built by someone *in* the flow, and the build-cost advantage commoditizes for everyone at once (§1).
 
-**Why this product is the Wiggleverse's beachhead.** Two nested beachheads are in play and shouldn't be confused: within *this* product, the launch *community* is tabletop miniatures (§5, Appendix A); but the product *itself* is the **beachhead for the whole [Wiggleverse](https://wiggleverse.org/) portfolio** — its first product, the proving ground for the org-level mission of ethical, non-extractive alternatives to extractive platforms. It earns that role on four counts:
+**Why this product is the Wiggleverse's beachhead.** Two nested beachheads are in play and shouldn't be confused: within *this* product, the launch *community* is miniatures (§5, Appendix A); but the product *itself* is the **beachhead for the whole [Wiggleverse](https://wiggleverse.org/) portfolio** — its first product, the proving ground for the org-level mission of ethical, non-extractive alternatives to extractive platforms. It earns that role on four counts:
 
 - **The fastest honest path to standing on its own feet.** Running a non-profit and the infrastructure under a platform takes money; commerce is where money moves most, so building close to commerce is the quickest route to a sustainable economic position ([Wiggleverse — why ecomm first](https://wiggleverse.org/ecomm/)). A self-sustaining beachhead is also what funds the rest of the portfolio (the *apps* and *learn* products to come) — the §12 economics read at org scale.
 - **The hardest, most complete test of the thesis.** This product exercises *every* load-bearing Wiggleverse bet at once: **non-extraction** (the out-of-flow, never-GMV-fee stance, §7/§11, *is* the org's "take only what it takes to run"), the **flow/network moat** against eroding incumbents (the §2/§4 thesis and the three moats above), **OHM ethics made concrete** (consent, agency, dignity, value, recourse show up as verification, provenance, and usage-rights — §7/§10/§11), and the **open-core partner ecosystem** (§7 partner network). Prove it here and the rest of the portfolio is de-risked.