docs(maker-platform): reconcile PR-FAQ<->memo divergences (illustrative pricing into memo; 'enforces'->'eases')

Superset audit found two real divergences:
- the illustrative all-in fee numbers (5-7%, ~3.6%, 13-16 pts) lived only
  in the PR-FAQ; port them into the memo §2/§7 so the memo stays superset
- PR-FAQ said the checkout 'enforces' the FTC 30-Day Rule; the memo is
  careful that the duty is the maker's and the platform only *eases* it
  (§11) — align the PR-FAQ wording

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-15 12:54:29 -07:00
parent 4ab2121e0d
commit 317a6b762c
2 changed files with 6 additions and 5 deletions
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@@ -359,9 +359,10 @@ flow design that keeps fees low means the network never holds your funds — so
nothing to refund *from*; escrow was declined deliberately (holding buyer funds is exactly nothing to refund *from*; escrow was declined deliberately (holding buyer funds is exactly
what triggers money-transmitter licensing — §11). Your monetary recourse is a what triggers money-transmitter licensing — §11). Your monetary recourse is a
**chargeback against the maker's own payment processor** (the maker is merchant of **chargeback against the maker's own payment processor** (the maker is merchant of
record), and the platform's compliance-by-design checkout enforces the **FTC 30-Day Rule** record), and the platform's compliance-by-design checkout **eases the maker's FTC 30-Day
— a maker who can't ship on time must notify and offer a refund — which is your first Rule duty** — prompting the delay notice and one-click cancel/refund when a window slips (the
recourse *before* a chargeback (§11). **Second, the platform's contribution is duty is the maker's; the platform doesn't assume it) — which is your first recourse *before*
a chargeback (§11). **Second, the platform's contribution is
consequence, not insurance.** Non-delivery drops the maker's standing: a **low, consequence, not insurance.** Non-delivery drops the maker's standing: a **low,
buyer-visible reputation score** and **loss of all network amplification** (Curated-By, the buyer-visible reputation score** and **loss of all network amplification** (Curated-By, the
buyer feed, referrals, the agent feed). They keep their storefront, but they fall out of buyer feed, referrals, the agent feed). They keep their storefront, but they fall out of
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@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Two maker-commerce-specific accelerants sit on top of the org thesis: **AI shopp
- **The fastest honest path to standing on its own feet.** Running a non-profit and the infrastructure under a platform takes money; commerce is where money moves most, so building close to commerce is the quickest route to a sustainable economic position ([Wiggleverse — why ecomm first](https://wiggleverse.org/ecomm/)). A self-sustaining beachhead is also what funds the rest of the portfolio (the *apps* and *learn* products to come) — the §12 economics read at org scale. - **The fastest honest path to standing on its own feet.** Running a non-profit and the infrastructure under a platform takes money; commerce is where money moves most, so building close to commerce is the quickest route to a sustainable economic position ([Wiggleverse — why ecomm first](https://wiggleverse.org/ecomm/)). A self-sustaining beachhead is also what funds the rest of the portfolio (the *apps* and *learn* products to come) — the §12 economics read at org scale.
- **The hardest, most complete test of the thesis.** This product exercises *every* load-bearing Wiggleverse bet at once: **non-extraction** (the out-of-flow, never-GMV-fee stance, §7/§11, *is* the org's "take only what it takes to run"), the **flow/network moat** against eroding incumbents (the §2/§4 thesis and the three moats above), **OHM ethics made concrete** (consent, agency, dignity, value, recourse show up as verification, provenance, and usage-rights — §7/§10/§11), and the **open-core partner ecosystem** (§7 partner network). Prove it here and the rest of the portfolio is de-risked. - **The hardest, most complete test of the thesis.** This product exercises *every* load-bearing Wiggleverse bet at once: **non-extraction** (the out-of-flow, never-GMV-fee stance, §7/§11, *is* the org's "take only what it takes to run"), the **flow/network moat** against eroding incumbents (the §2/§4 thesis and the three moats above), **OHM ethics made concrete** (consent, agency, dignity, value, recourse show up as verification, provenance, and usage-rights — §7/§10/§11), and the **open-core partner ecosystem** (§7 partner network). Prove it here and the rest of the portfolio is de-risked.
- **The most tangible "give value, not extract" demonstration.** Commerce makes the ethic legible in dollars — *our fee + your processor ≈ X% vs Etsy's ~20%* (§7) — so the mission is a number on every sale, not a slogan ("what is enough? — enough to keep the lights on, and no more"). - **The most tangible "give value, not extract" demonstration.** Commerce makes the ethic legible in dollars — *our fee + your processor ≈ 47% vs Etsy's ~20%* (§7) — so the mission is a number on every sale, not a slogan ("what is enough? — enough to keep the lights on, and no more").
- **"Small businesses are really just people."** Serving independent makers directly *is* the OHM mission — *treat humans as humans* — applied to the place commerce had most thoroughly turned them into accounts and line items. - **"Small businesses are really just people."** Serving independent makers directly *is* the OHM mission — *treat humans as humans* — applied to the place commerce had most thoroughly turned them into accounts and line items.
--- ---
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ Out of the money flow, your fee is a **platform fee billed in arrears via ACH/in
- **Tiered "graduate" pricing.** Starter: $0/low monthly + a modest **percentage** (≈24%) on captured orders (cold-start-friendly). Pro: flat **$2949/mo + 0%** (predictable, easy to collect, at scale). Auto-graduate by GMV so makers don't overpay. Use a **percentage, not a per-order flat fee**, on low-AOV makers (a flat $0.50 over-taxes a $12 item). - **Tiered "graduate" pricing.** Starter: $0/low monthly + a modest **percentage** (≈24%) on captured orders (cold-start-friendly). Pro: flat **$2949/mo + 0%** (predictable, easy to collect, at scale). Auto-graduate by GMV so makers don't overpay. Use a **percentage, not a per-order flat fee**, on low-AOV makers (a flat $0.50 over-taxes a $12 item).
- **Charge on captured/fulfilled orders, not pledges** — don't bill money that never cleared. - **Charge on captured/fulfilled orders, not pledges** — don't bill money that never cleared.
- **Market the all-in transparently:** "our fee + your own processor ≈ X% vs Etsy's ~20%." Not bundling processing is the wedge — say it in numbers. - **Market the all-in transparently:** "our fee + your own processor ≈ X% vs Etsy's ~20%." Not bundling processing is the wedge — say it in numbers. Illustratively (shape, not validated rates): a Starter maker at ~$1,200/mo runs ~24% platform + ~3% processor ≈ **57%** all-in; a Pro maker at ~$6,000/mo runs $39/mo + ~3% processor ≈ **~3.6%** all-in — versus Etsy's ~20% either way, i.e. the maker keeps roughly **1316 percentage points more of every sale.**
**Referral economics.** On a referred order, two layers stack. **The platform's spread is fixed and never negotiated** — ≈35% of the order (it may scale with the sale and carry a $ cap), the network's one piece of referral revenue, and *the same percentage regardless of which referred item sells* — which is what makes the ranking-neutrality guarantee structural rather than a promise ("Curated By This Maker" above). **Maker A's reward sits above the spread and is the makers' to set:** A and B negotiate it through platform tooling — a flat %, a tiered rate ("x% over $y"), a max-$ cap — and may **renegotiate** as the relationship evolves, with one floor, the spread. So B always pays *at least* the spread; set A's reward to zero and no referral money changes hands while the platform still earns its spread. (This negotiability is **scoped to maker↔maker** referrals; the pure non-maker taste-maker tier keeps **uniform, non-biddable** rates — it lacks the peer-respect counterweight — see "Non-maker referrers" below.) Keep the legs as **two separate events** — B→Platform (a fee on B's invoice) and Platform→A (a credit you extend) — so you're **principal on both sides, never a conduit** moving money B→A. That independence keeps it out of money-transmission territory, and holds *only* while A's credit is non-cashable. **Referral economics.** On a referred order, two layers stack. **The platform's spread is fixed and never negotiated** — ≈35% of the order (it may scale with the sale and carry a $ cap), the network's one piece of referral revenue, and *the same percentage regardless of which referred item sells* — which is what makes the ranking-neutrality guarantee structural rather than a promise ("Curated By This Maker" above). **Maker A's reward sits above the spread and is the makers' to set:** A and B negotiate it through platform tooling — a flat %, a tiered rate ("x% over $y"), a max-$ cap — and may **renegotiate** as the relationship evolves, with one floor, the spread. So B always pays *at least* the spread; set A's reward to zero and no referral money changes hands while the platform still earns its spread. (This negotiability is **scoped to maker↔maker** referrals; the pure non-maker taste-maker tier keeps **uniform, non-biddable** rates — it lacks the peer-respect counterweight — see "Non-maker referrers" below.) Keep the legs as **two separate events** — B→Platform (a fee on B's invoice) and Platform→A (a credit you extend) — so you're **principal on both sides, never a conduit** moving money B→A. That independence keeps it out of money-transmission territory, and holds *only* while A's credit is non-cashable.