# SESSION-0026.6 TRANSCRIPT — OHM security audit subsession (systemd / nginx / TLS / GCP IAM / firewall / secrets)

- **Subsession:** 0026.6 of OHM security-audit driver session 0026
- **Parent transcript:** SESSION-0026.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T13-46--INPROGRESS.md
- **Start:** 2026-05-28T13-46 (America/Los_Angeles)  **End:** 2026-05-28T13-52
- **Mode:** READ-ONLY audit of LIVE infrastructure (project `wiggleverse-ohm`, host ohm.wiggleverse.org)
- **Mandate surface:** systemd unit hardening, service user, file perms, nginx/TLS/headers, GCP IAM + firewall + secrets + VM SA/scopes + static IP, session-history secret-byte spot-check.
- **No secret bytes appear anywhere in this transcript** (§3 invariant 1 / conversation corollary). `.env` was read for variable NAMES + perms/owner only; values never echoed.

---

## Pre-state

- gcloud authed (active accounts incl. ben.stull@wiggleverse.org), project `wiggleverse-ohm`.
- Coordination: sessions 0022.0 and 0026.0 marked ACTIVE/INPROGRESS in ohm-session-history. 0022.0 was mid VM-rename (ohm-app -> ohm-rfc-app) + deploy. I observed only; did not interfere.
- VM rename observed COMPLETE by sample time: instance `ohm-rfc-app` (us-central1-a, RUNNING, NAT 136.116.40.66); systemd unit `ohm-rfc-app.service` active (restarted ~1m41s before sampling — i.e. 0022's deploy had just landed); legacy `ohm-app.service` no longer present.

## Turn-by-turn arc

1. Claimed a session ID via `claim-session-id.sh --start 2026-05-28T13-46`. **NOTE/ARTIFACT:** as a *subsession* (0026.6) I should not have run the top-level claim — it computed + PUSHED a top-level `0027` placeholder (`SESSION-0027.0-...--INPROGRESS.md`) to the shared repo. This is a stray placeholder that needs retraction/finalization by the driver. (Read-only-infra mandate honored; this is the session-history repo, not infra. I did not push further changes to retract it to avoid racing 0022.0/0026.0.)
2. Read `ssh.py` (gcloud compute ssh wrapper, no keys held, OS Login) + `registry.py` (deployment schema). `flotilla deployment show ohm-rfc-app` gave VM name/zone/user/install dir/unit.
3. `gcloud compute instances list` + `describe`: default compute SA, default GCE scope set (NO cloud-platform), `enable-oslogin` instance metadata set, Shielded (vTPM + integrity ON, **Secure Boot OFF**), tags http-server/https-server.
4. `gcloud projects get-iam-policy`: only ben.stull = owner + secretmanager.admin + secretAccessor; service agents only otherwise. **No Editor sprawl, no default-SA project role, no SA user-managed keys, no extra humans.** (Refuted the standard "default SA has Editor" finding — it has no project role here.)
5. `gcloud compute firewall-rules list`: default-allow-ssh (22) and default-allow-rdp (3389) open to 0.0.0.0/0; http/https to world (expected); internal 10.128.0.0/9.
6. `gcloud secrets list`: 7 `ohm-rfc-app-*` named secrets + 4 hash-named (likely Certbot/other). Per-secret `get-iam-policy` for several = EMPTY (no per-secret bindings) -> secret access is project-IAM-only (ben.stull). VM default SA has NO secretAccessor (consistent with flotilla deploy-time resolution via operator ADC).
7. `gcloud compute addresses list`: static IP `ohm-app-ip` 136.116.40.66 IN_USE; USERS self-link still references `.../instances/ohm-app` (stale label after rename; IP correctly attached). Cosmetic.
8. SSH read-only batch #1 (systemctl cat/status, unit file perms): unit hardening baseline present; backend `uvicorn --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000 --proxy-headers --forwarded-allow-ips 127.0.0.1`.
9. SSH batch #2 (`systemctl show` effective props, service user, app/.env/DB perms, `ss -tlnp`): see findings. `.env` 600 owner-only (solid); SQLite DB **644 world-readable**; CapabilityBoundingSet = full default set; several Protect*/Restrict*/SystemCallFilter unset.
10. SSH batch #3 (`nginx -T` greps, site files): proxy_pass localhost, client_max_body_size 4M, certbot TLS1.2/1.3 + modern ciphers in server block; nginx.conf http-block line 34 lists TLSv1/1.1 (latent). No security `add_header` except Cache-Control. server_tokens commented out.
11. Local TLS/header checks (openssl s_client, curl -sI): LE E7 ECDSA cert valid 2026-05-26..08-24, HTTP->HTTPS 301. **Adversarially verified TLS1.0 and TLS1.1 are REJECTED (alert 70), TLS1.2 OK** -> KILLED the "TLS1.0/1.1 enabled" finding as a live exposure (server-block override wins over http-block line 34; line 34 downgraded to latent/informational). Confirmed NO security headers (no HSTS/CSP/X-Frame-Options/nosniff/Referrer-Policy) on / and /api/health. Server version banner leaks `nginx/1.22.1`.
12. SSH batch #4 (sshd -T, nginx 443 default, unattended-upgrades, fail2ban): sshd permitrootlogin no / passwordauth no / pubkey-only -> heavily mitigates world-open :22 (DOWNGRADED that finding). unattended-upgrades enabled. fail2ban inactive (low value given no password auth).
13. Cloned ohm-session-history (30 transcripts), grepped for sk-ant/AKIA/private-key/ghp_/xox + secret-name=longvalue assignments: only `FILL_FROM_*` placeholders matched -> session-history secret-byte spot-check CLEAN.

## Cut state — findings

(severity / confidence after self-refutation)

- **F1 — SQLite DB world-readable.** `/opt/ohm-rfc-app/backend/data/ohm-app.db` mode `644` owner `ohm-rfc-app`. Any local user/process can read all app data (users, OAuth identities, sessions, content). Remediation: `chmod 640` (or 600) the DB + ensure umask in deploy. **MEDIUM, HIGH conf.** (mitigated: single-tenant host, few local users.) Filename still pre-rename `ohm-app.db` — cosmetic.
- **F2 — No HTTP security headers.** No HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy on ohm.wiggleverse.org (verified via curl on / and /api/health; nginx has only `add_header Cache-Control` on static). Clickjacking + SSL-strip-on-first-visit + MIME-sniff exposure for an app doing OAuth/auth. Remediation: add HSTS (with preload once confident), X-Frame-Options DENY / CSP frame-ancestors, nosniff, Referrer-Policy in the ohm server block. **MEDIUM(-HIGH), HIGH conf.**
- **F3 — systemd CapabilityBoundingSet not restricted.** Effective bounding set = full default (cap_sys_admin, cap_sys_module, cap_bpf, cap_sys_ptrace, etc.). Unit sets no `CapabilityBoundingSet=`. Real impact LOW (process runs non-root uid 999 + NoNewPrivileges=true, so no effective caps), but violates least-privilege. Remediation: `CapabilityBoundingSet=` (empty) — service binds 8000 so needs none. **LOW-MEDIUM, HIGH conf.**
- **F4 — systemd deeper sandbox knobs unset.** PrivateDevices=no, ProtectKernelTunables=no, ProtectKernelModules=no, ProtectControlGroups=no, RestrictAddressFamilies unset, SystemCallFilter unset, LockPersonality=no, MemoryDenyWriteExecute=no, RestrictNamespaces=no. (Unit comment self-describes as "modest defaults.") Defense-in-depth gaps. Remediation: add the above (RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX; SystemCallFilter=@system-service; etc.). **LOW, HIGH conf.**
- **F5 — Firewall: SSH(22) + RDP(3389) open to 0.0.0.0/0.** DOWNGRADED: SSH is well-mitigated (OS Login enabled instance-level + sshd passwordauth=no, permitrootlogin=no, pubkey-only) so it requires a valid GCP IAM identity; remaining risk is brute-force noise / SSH 0-day surface. RDP rule is pure dead surface on a Linux host (nothing listens on 3389). Remediation: delete default-allow-rdp; restrict :22 to IAP range (35.235.240.0/20) or known admin IPs, prefer --tunnel-through-iap. **LOW (SSH) / LOW (RDP), HIGH conf.**
- **F6 — VM uses default compute service account.** `727327350842-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com`. Mitigated: it holds NO project IAM role and NO secretAccessor, and scopes are the default set (no cloud-platform). Best practice is a dedicated minimal SA, but blast radius today is small. **LOW, HIGH conf.**
- **F7 — Shielded VM Secure Boot OFF.** vTPM + integrity monitoring ON, Secure Boot OFF. Remediation: enable Secure Boot (requires stop/start; coordinate). **LOW, MED conf.**
- **F8 — nginx version banner disclosure.** `Server: nginx/1.22.1` leaked; `server_tokens off;` is commented out. Remediation: enable `server_tokens off`. **LOW, HIGH conf.**
- **F9 — nginx.conf http-block lists TLSv1/TLSv1.1 (line 34).** LATENT only — overridden by the certbot server-block (TLS1.0/1.1 verified rejected live). Risk: a future vhost without the certbot include would inherit weak protocols. Remediation: fix the http-block default to TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3. **INFORMATIONAL/LOW, HIGH conf.**
- **F10 — Static IP / DB stale naming.** `ohm-app-ip` address USERS self-link references old `ohm-app` instance; DB file `ohm-app.db`. Cosmetic post-rename drift, no security impact. **INFO.**

### Killed / refuted
- "TLS 1.0/1.1 enabled" — refuted: live handshake rejects both (alert 70).
- "Default SA has project Editor" — refuted: default SA has no project-level role at all.
- "Backend :8000 exposed" — refuted: binds 127.0.0.1 only; firewall has no :8000 rule.
- "World-open SSH is high" — downgraded: OS Login + pubkey-only + no root login.
- "Secrets readable by VM/others" — refuted: per-secret IAM empty, project-IAM grants accessor only to ben.stull.

### What's solid
- `.env` 600 owner-only; service runs as dedicated nologin uid 999 with no extra groups, owns only its app dir.
- Backend bound to 127.0.0.1:8000, nginx proxy_pass localhost, --forwarded-allow-ips 127.0.0.1, client_max_body_size 4M.
- TLS: LE ECDSA cert valid, TLS1.2/1.3 only (verified), modern ciphers, session tickets off, HTTP->HTTPS 301.
- sshd: pubkey-only, no root login, no password/empty-password auth; OS Login on.
- IAM minimal (single owner, no SA keys, no editor sprawl); VM SA has no project role + no secretAccessor; default (not cloud-platform) scopes.
- unattended-upgrades enabled.
- ohm-session-history spot-check: no secret bytes across 30 transcripts (only FILL_FROM_* placeholders).
- systemd baseline hardening present (NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, ReadWritePaths scoped to data dir).

## Driver-needs-to-know
- **Stray `0027` INPROGRESS placeholder** was pushed to ohm-session-history by my claim-script call (I should not have claimed as a subsession). Driver should retract/finalize it.
- Top remediations by value: F1 (chmod DB 640) and F2 (security headers) first; both low-effort, real defense-in-depth wins. Then F3/F4 (systemd caps + sandbox) as a single unit edit, F5 (drop RDP rule, restrict/IAP SSH).
- 0022's deploy had just landed at sample time; everything observed is post-rename steady state. No deploy was in progress during my SSH samples; no locks touched.

## §19.2 candidates (flotilla-core extraction)
- A `flotilla harden check` verb could codify the systemd-unit + nginx-header + DB-perms assertions as a post-deploy audit (generic across deployments). The hardening expectations (F1–F4, F8) are deployment-shape-agnostic and would live in flotilla-core, with per-deployment exceptions in §13.
