# SESSION-0026.3 — OHM security audit subsession: webhooks, CAPTCHA, email

Parent: [SESSION-0026.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T13-46--INPROGRESS.md](./SESSION-0026.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T13-46--INPROGRESS.md)
Subsession: 0026.3
Mode: READ-ONLY security audit. No mutations. Only file written: this transcript.
Target: rfc-app @ v0.24.0 (commit 28015ed), /Users/benstull/git/rfc-app
Date: 2026-05-28, America/Los_Angeles

## Surface
Webhooks (backend/app/webhooks.py), Turnstile/CAPTCHA (backend/app/turnstile.py),
email (email.py, email_otc.py, email_invite.py, email_envelope.py + the
api_invitations.py / api_notifications.py call/receive sites).

## Pre-state
Came in with the three-part brief (webhook HMAC/replay/unknown-repo; Turnstile
verify/fail-open/single-use/coverage; email header-injection/redirect/SSRF).
No prior knowledge of these modules.

## Turn-by-turn arc

1. Confirmed tag v0.24.0, read webhooks.py + turnstile.py in full.
   - Webhook: HMAC-SHA256 over the *raw* `await request.body()` bytes (good),
     `hmac.compare_digest` (good), secret required at config-load (config.py
     refuses to start without GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET unless RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1).
     Verification happens BEFORE any json.loads / cache action. Unknown-repo path
     (#18) only logs — no unsafe action. No replay/dedup (delivery-id/timestamp).
   - Turnstile: success field checked; network/parse failure -> reason="network"
     (fail-CLOSED only when TURNSTILE_REQUIRED=true; fail-OPEN by default when
     secret unset). Token never cached -> single-use enforced by Cloudflare.

2. Read all email modules + envelope builder. Found a 5th sender (api_invitations.py
   RFC-invite) beyond the 4 named in the brief — also routes through build_envelope.

3. Located enforcement sites: Turnstile wired ONLY to /auth/otc/request (main.py:255).
   Checked beta-request (api.py:441, require_user) and propose (api.py:766,
   require_contributor) — both require an authenticated session, so Turnstile is
   correctly unneeded there. The unauthenticated abuse hot path (OTC request) is
   the one that needs it, and it's covered. -> KILLED the "Turnstile missing on
   beta/propose" candidate.

4. Header-injection probe. Empirically tested Python 3.13 EmailMessage:
   - `m["To"]=`, `m["Subject"]=`, and `formataddr((display,addr))` assignment all
     raise ValueError on embedded CR/LF (default EmailPolicy). Code uses
     EmailMessage (NOT legacy email.mime), so the classic header-injection vector
     is closed at the stdlib layer for To/From/Subject/display-name.
   -> KILLED "CRLF header injection / BCC smuggling" as exploitable. Downgraded to
      a minor availability note (a malicious display name -> uncaught ValueError ->
      500), needs-verification on whether that path is reachable with attacker text.

5. email-bounce webhook (api_notifications.py:543): unauthenticated when
   WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET unset (the documented v1 dev default); flips
   email_opt_out_all=1 for any matching user email. Constant-time compare when set.

6. Confirmed unsubscribe tokens: itsdangerous URLSafeSerializer signed with
   SECRET_KEY, salt "email-unsubscribe", scoped to (user_id, category). No expiry
   (intentional, revocable by rotating SECRET_KEY). app_url is operator-controlled
   (no open-redirect via user input). siteverify URL is fixed (no SSRF).

## Cut state — findings

- F1 (LOW/Medium-conf): email-bounce webhook unauthenticated by default
  (WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET unset) -> unauth attacker can force global
  email opt-out for any known address (DoS on a user's mail). Mitigated in prod
  IF the secret is wired; needs-verification that OHM's overlay sets it.
- F2 (INFO): no webhook replay protection (no delivery-id/timestamp dedup) on
  the Gitea receiver. Low impact — handlers are idempotent cache refreshes, no
  state mutation from payload contents. Acceptable; documented for completeness.
- F3 (LOW/availability, needs-verification): malicious display-name containing
  CR/LF reaching build_envelope raises uncaught ValueError -> 500. Not injection.
- KILLED: CRLF header injection / BCC smuggling (stdlib guard).
- KILLED: Turnstile missing on beta-request/propose (both auth-gated).
- KILLED: Turnstile token replay (not cached; Cloudflare enforces single-use).

## Driver needs to know
- Verify OHM overlay sets WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET (F1) and
  TURNSTILE_REQUIRED=true (else Turnstile fails OPEN if the secret regresses).
- These are env/overlay checks for the flotilla side, not rfc-app code bugs.

## §19.2 candidates
- Webhook delivery-id dedup could become a shared flotilla-core concern if more
  webhook receivers land. Not urgent.
